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Private law deals with the interactions of persons in society.  If we 
think about all the effects produced by the relation between each pair 
of persons and then unlimited chains of such interactions — A sells 
Blackacre to B, who sells to C, who mortgages to D and rents to E, 
and so on — then prescribing results for such interactions is a poten-
tially intractable problem.  Private law would be an impossible enter-
prise.  This is where property comes in. 
Property is a platform for the rest of private law.  The New Private 
Law takes seriously the need for baselines in general and the tradition-
al ones furnished by the law in particular.  And nowhere is this issue of 
baselines more salient than in property.  I argue that the baselines that 
property furnishes, as well as their refinements and equitable safety 
valves, are shaped by information costs.  For information-cost reasons, 
property is, after all, a law of things. 
Property as a law of things, however, suffers from a serious image 
problem in American legal theory.  In stark contrast, other legal sys-
tems treat property as a right to a thing and property law as the “law 
of things.”1  An “in rem” right originally meant a right “in a thing,” 
and I argue that it is the mediation of a thing that helps give property 
its in rem character — availing against persons generally. 
But if legal realism and its progeny insisted on anything, it was 
that property is not about things.2  According to this conventional 
wisdom, property is a bundle of rights and other legal relations avail-
ing between persons.  Things form the mere backdrop to these social 
relations, and a largely dispensable one at that.  Particularly with the 
rise of intangible property, so this story goes, the notions of ownership 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  ∗  Fessenden Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.  I would like to thank Yun-chien Chang, 
Eric Claeys, Bob Ellickson, Tom Merrill, Jeremy Newman, Peter Turner, and participants at the 
Symposium for their helpful comments.  All errors are mine. 
  1  See, e.g., NIGEL FOSTER & SATISH SULE, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM  AND LAWS 493 
(4th ed. 2010) (explaining Sachenrecht in accordance with its name as the law of things); 2 A.N. 
YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: PROPERTY §§ 12, 15 (4th ed. 2011); Yun-
chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common Law Property, 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (manuscript at 37–39), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2017816. 
  2  See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,  35 
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 815 (1935) (“The circularity of legal reasoning in the whole field of unfair 
competition is veiled by the ‘thingification’ of property.”); see also infra Part I.    
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and property have become so fragmented and untethered to things 
that property is merely a conclusion, a label we affix to the cluster of 
entitlements that result from intelligent policymaking.3  By contrast, 
according to the realist and postrealist conventional wisdom, the tradi-
tional baselines provided by property law not only were 
undertheorized and underjustified, but also represented a pernicious 
superstition and an obstacle to clear thinking and progressive remak-
ing of the social order.4  An inclination to take traditional property 
baselines seriously can then be dismissed as a failure to get with the 
program and a reflection of lack of sophistication or a partiality for en-
trenched interests. 
I want to suggest that this familiar picture has things exactly 
backward.  It is the extreme realist picture that is myopic, inflexible, 
and ultimately unworkable and the traditional baselines that, while in 
need of constant improvement, are very worthy of explanation and a 
good deal of respect.  The point is not to restore prerealist formalism 
but to ask why property sometimes is formal and sometimes is not. 
The first step toward understanding private law is to try not to 
take things for granted and to be as attentive to how things are not as 
to how things are.  As we will see, this type of detachment makes some 
room for formalism, which is somewhat ironic because commentators 
since the legal realist era have generally criticized prerealist “formal-
ism” for being complacent and taking traditional baselines and doc-
trine as given.  Whether that was ever so, it is first of all important to 
distinguish between, on the one hand, making open-ended inquiries 
about property law and, on the other, building open-ended inquiry into 
the decisionmaking processes of judges and others operating the sys-
tem of property law.  There is nothing inconsistent about a highly   
contextual explanation of a system that itself eschews context — is 
“formalist” — in important respects.  One might have a highly complex 
theory of traffic patterns and still conclude that it is best to promulgate 
flat speed limits and a duty to stop at red traffic lights and stop signs 
regardless of the amount of traffic in the other direction.  We must 
avoid confusing the ordinary level of analysis within a system with the 
metalevel of propositions about that system.  In this Article I argue 
that at a metalevel, the bundle of rights is hardly a theory of property 
at all and that an architectural approach to property can do much  
better. 
To get anywhere, we have to be clear about the difference between 
means and ends in property.  Property has purposes and employs vari-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  3  Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property,  in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY  69 (J.  
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980). 
  4  Id.; Cohen, supra note 2, at 815–16; see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What 
Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 357–58, 365 (2001).    
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ous means to serve them.  The purposes of property relate to our inter-
est in using things.5  Desirable features of a system of property — sta-
bility, promotion of investment, autonomy, efficiency, fairness — relate 
to the interest in use.  There is no interest in exclusion per se.  Instead, 
exclusion strategies, including the right to exclude, serve the interest in 
use; by enjoying the right to exclude through torts like trespass, an 
owner can pursue her interest in a wide range of uses that usually need 
not be legally specified.  For certain important potential use conflicts, 
the law specifies uses more directly, either through private law (proper-
ty governance regimes, torts, contracts), public regulation, or custom.  
What realism and the bundle of rights typically fail to do is to distin-
guish between the purposes of property and the various means — 
trespass, nuisance, servitudes, zoning, and custom — to achieve them.  
Realism tends to assume a one-to-one and relatively direct relationship 
between the features of property and the purposes they serve, and not 
surprisingly, realists also regard property as plastic and responsive to 
policy-oriented refashioning.  Once we recognize the distinction be-
tween our interest in using things and the institutions that property 
law sets up to serve those interests, the role of property baselines as a 
means for achieving property’s ends becomes clearer. 
This Article argues that an information-cost account of the means 
property uses to serve its ends helps explain many features of proper-
ty  — and how they work together to achieve property’s purposes.   
Property is a shortcut over the “complete” property system that would, 
in limitlessly tailored fashion, specify all the rights, duties, privileges, 
and so forth, holding between persons with respect to the most fine-
grained uses of the most articulated attributes of resources.6  Property 
starts by taking advantage of the fact that some connections among 
people, uses, and attributes of things are more important than others.  
Property organizes this world into lumpy packages of legal relations — 
legal things — by setting boundaries around useful attributes that tend 
to be strong complements.  The law of property in effect encapsulates 
these lumpy packages, or modules, semitransparently from other mod-
ules and the outside world generally.7  Thus, property defines things 
using an exclusion strategy of “keep off” or “don’t touch” and then en-
riches the system of domains of owner control with interfaces using 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  5  J.E.  PENNER, THE  IDEA  OF  PROPERTY  IN  LAW  70 ( 1997); Christopher M. Newman, 
Transformation in Property and Copyright, 56 VILL. L. REV. 251, 260 (2011); Henry E. Smith, In-
tellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information,  116 Y ALE  L.J.  1742, 
1751–53 (2007). 
  6  See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean, 54 J.L. 
& ECON. (forthcoming 2012) (Harvard Law & Econ. Discussion Paper No. 688, 2011; Columbia 
Pub. Law Research Paper No. 11-262,  2011) (manuscript at 25–27),  available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1758846. 
  7  Smith, supra note 5, at 1748–49.    
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governance strategies.8  These strategies zoom in on relations between 
neighbors in the case of land, and between owners (and their things) 
and other parties in the case of both land and personal property. 
Importantly, taking the architectural view raises the overlooked 
question of why things could not be otherwise.  Why not use gover-
nance rules all the time?  Why does property seem to be related to the 
notion of a thing and to residual claims?  Why is the right to exclude 
important but also easy to overstate as the be-all and end-all of prop-
erty?  I will show that an architectural theory of property based on in-
formation costs and the advantages of using modularity to manage 
complexity can help answer those questions in a unified fashion.  At 
the same time, such a theory shows how property fits, with its thing-
based baselines, into the larger picture of private law. 
Part I argues that much of what travels under the heading of 
“property theory” fails to be a theory.  The bundle picture in particular 
lacks a parsimonious account of the structure of property.  By contrast, 
Part II shows how an information-cost account of property does pro-
vide an explanation — even if only a partial one — for many of prop-
erty’s features and their interrelation.  The complexity of interactions 
among legal actors is managed by breaking them into components, in a 
modular system of law, and this process begins with defining the mod-
ular things of property.  Part III evaluates the modular theory in terms 
of its explanatory power and draws out some of its implications in ar-
eas from trespass to entity property.  Part IV shows how regarding 
property as a law of modular things helps define the baselines needed 
for private law in general. 
I.  WHAT IS A THEORY OF PROPERTY? 
What makes for a good theory of property is not different from 
what makes for a good theory of anything else.  But the advent of the 
New Private Law is a good occasion for taking stock of how current 
property theories stack up as theories.  I argue that the bundle of 
rights by itself is more of a description than a theory and that the more 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  8  See Steven N.S. Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive 
Resource, 13 J.L. & ECON. 49, 64 (1970); Barry C. Field, The Evolution of Property Rights, 42 
KYKLOS 319, 321–29 (1989); Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management 
Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 9–36.  See generally Henry E. Smith, Exclu-
sion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 
(2002).  It is worth noting that strategies for managing rights to use open-access resources tend 
also to rely on simple, easily known rules, which also economize on information costs.  See, e.g., 
Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Y ALE L.J. 1315, 1322–23, 1334–35 (1993) (discussing 
conditions under which internal social control can handle large events); Carol Rose, The Comedy 
of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 
739–49 (1986) (describing simple regimes employed by a self-organizing public to manage open-
access resources).    
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extreme versions of the bundle of rights fail to be a theory at all — in 
contrast to a modular theory of property, and to property as a thing in 
particular. 
The bundle-of-rights picture of property draws on social science 
and accordingly aspires to be a scientific theory of property.9  T o be 
sure, other types of theorizing, based on a more interpretative method-
ology and seeking coherence as a main goal, are also compatible with 
the New Private Law.  But in this Article I accept the social-scientific 
theoretical style of the bundle in order to show that an information-
cost theory succeeds better on those terms. 
As with scientific theories in general, a property theory should aim 
to explain more facts with less machinery.10  Multiple criteria make 
theories harder to compare.  The difficulty of testing a theory in isola-
tion from a research program and the very nature of theory testing can 
be glossed over for now because I argue that the modular theory both 
captures more facts and uses less machinery than the pure bundle of 
rights.  A good theory should also not be purely reactive: at the very 
least, the theory should frame what would count as counterevidence,11 
or the research program of which the theory is a part should lead to 
the discovery of new facts.12  A theoretical description should have 
some predictive value in that it should correctly lead us to expect cer-
tain property systems under a new set of conditions and to predict 
what if anything should be invariant across legal systems.  In other 
words, a parsimonious and accurate description of the existing proper-
ty system or systems should generalize in a straightforward way to 
new circumstances. 
Does the bundle meet these criteria for good theorizing?  The bun-
dle has at its core a basic ambiguity: it is both an analytical device and 
a family of theories of property that elevate that analytic device to a 
central place.  As an analytical device, the bundle of rights theory 
harks back to Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld and before, in attempts to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  9  See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 26–31, 
97–103 (1977) (contrasting the “scientific” perspective that views property as a bundle of rights 
with the “layman’s” perspective that persists in thinking of property as rights to things). 
  10  See BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN, THE SCIENTIFIC IMAGE 87 (1980) (“When a theory is advo-
cated, it is praised for many features other than empirical adequacy and strength: it is said to be 
mathematically elegant, simple, of great scope, complete in certain respects: also of wonderful use 
in unifying our account of hitherto disparate phenomena, and most of all, explanatory.”); see also 
RICHARD S. RUDNER, PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 11 (1966). 
  11  For a strong version of this criterion, see KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC 
DISCOVERY 41 (1959) (“I shall require [of a scientific system] that its logical form shall be such 
that it can be singled out, by means of empirical tests, in a negative sense: it must be possible for 
an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience.”). 
  12  See generally  1 I MRE  LAKATOS, THE  METHODOLOGY  OF  SCIENTIFIC  RESEARCH 
PROGRAMMES (John Worrall & Gregory Currie eds., 1978) (discussing progressive and degener-
ating research programs).    
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analyze legal relations into their smallest atoms.13  Hohfeld disliked 
ambiguity in terms like “right” and thought that concepts like property 
were collections of more fundamental legal relations that were related 
to each other as correlates and opposites.14  Thus rights, privileges, 
powers, and immunities in one party corresponded to duties, no-rights, 
liabilities, and disabilities in the party at the other end of the relation.  
And the scheme was quite elegant in that rights were the opposite of 
no-rights, and privileges the opposite of duties; similarly the pairs 
power-disability and immunity-liability were also opposites.  In an at-
tempt to capture the in rem aspect of some relations — that a right, for 
example, could avail against others generally — Hohfeld treated those 
relations as collections of in personam relations: a “multital” relation 
was a collection of many similar “unital” relations, and a “paucital” re-
lation was the collection of few similar unital relations.15 
As an analytical device, the bundle picture can be very useful.  It 
provides a highly accurate description of who can do what to whom in 
a legal (and perhaps nonlegal) sense.  It provides an interesting theo-
retical baseline: how would one describe the relation of a property 
owner to various others if one were writing on a blank slate and doing 
the description in a fully bottom-up manner, relation by relation, party 
by party?  In this, the Hohfeldian world is a little like the Coasean 
world of zero transaction costs16 — a useful theoretical construct. 
The resemblance is no accident.  Like the zero-transaction-cost 
world, no property system ever has or will build up legal relations 
smallest piece by smallest piece.  Interestingly, in a zero-transaction-
cost world, one could do just that, and any benefit to be secured by 
parsing out relations in a fine-grained manner could be obtained at  
zero cost.  That is not our world. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  13  The roots of this conception of property can be traced to Hohfeld’s work, although he did 
not use the metaphor of a bundle of sticks.  See Max Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 HARV. 
L. REV. 1141, 1146–63 (1938) (interpreting the Hohfeldian scheme from a legal realist’s point of 
view).  Gregory Alexander has traced the first known use of the bundle-picture metaphor to a late 
nineteenth-century treatise on eminent domain.  See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY 
& PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776–
1970, at 455 n.40 (1997) (citing JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DO-
MAIN IN THE UNITED STATES 43 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1888)); see also JAMES W. ELY, 
JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS 3–9 (3d ed. 2008). 
  14  Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28–59 (1913).  
  15  Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reason-
ing, 26 Y ALE L.J. 710, 718–33 (1917).  The problem with reducing property’s in rem aspect to 
numerosity of duty bearers is that it fails to capture the indefiniteness and open-endedness of the 
class of duty bearers.  See Albert Kocourek, Rights in Rem, 68 U. PA. L. REV. 322, 335 (1920); see 
also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface,  101 C OLUM.  L. 
REV. 773, 780–89 (2001). 
  16  See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 7 (1960).    
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The problem with the bundle of rights is that it is treated as a the-
ory of how our world works rather than as an analytical device or as a 
theoretical baseline.  In the realist era, the benefits of tinkering with 
property were expressed in bundle terms without a corresponding the-
ory of the costs of that tinkering.  Indeed, in the most tendentious ver-
sions of the picture, the traditional baselines of the law were mocked, 
and the idea was to dethrone them in order to remove them as barriers 
to enlightened social engineering.17  In this version of the bundle pic-
ture, Hohfeldian sticks and potentially others are posited to describe 
the relations holding between persons; the fact that the relations hold 
with respect to a thing is relatively unimportant or, in some versions, 
of no importance.18  “Property” is simply a conclusory label we might 
attach to the collection.19  In its classic formulation, the bundle picture 
puts no particular constraints on the contents of bundles: they are to-
tally malleable and should respond to policy concerns in a fairly direct 
fashion.  These policy-motivated adjustments usually involve adding 
or subtracting sticks and reallocating them among concerned parties or 
to society.20  This version of the bundle explains everything and so ex-
plains nothing. 
But the bundle is nothing if not protean.  In recent times, various 
commentators have argued that property is not fully captured by the 
bundle picture.  Going beyond the bundle usually involves emphasiz-
ing exclusion or some robust notion of the right to use.  It can be moti-
vated by analytical jurisprudence,21 natural rights,22 or information-
cost economics.23  The bundle theory can incorporate some of these 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  17  See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 2, at 809, 833–49. 
  18  See, e.g., Arthur L. Corbin, Comment, Taxation of Seats on the Stock Exchange, 31 Y ALE 
L.J. 429, 429 (1922) (“Our concept of property has shifted . . . . ‘[P]roperty’ has ceased to describe 
any res, or object of sense, at all, and has become merely a bundle of legal relations — rights, 
powers, privileges, immunities.”).  
  19  See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 
1044, 1086 (1984) (“[P]roperty is simply a label for whatever ‘bundle of sticks’ the individual has 
been granted.”); Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 297 (1998) (“La-
beling something as property does not predetermine what rights an owner does or does not have 
in it.”). 
  20  See, e.g., Grey, supra note 3, at 69–70; Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 365.  See generally 
BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE (1998). 
  21  See, e.g., J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 30–32 (1996); PENNER, supra note 5, at 
68–74; Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, 
and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 593 (2008); Thomas W. Merrill, 
Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 731 (1998); Eric R. Claeys, Exclusion 
and Exclusivity in Gridlock, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 17–28 (2011) (book review). 
  22  See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics, and 
Natural Property Rights,  85 N OTRE  DAME  L.  REV.  1379,  1398–1420 ( 2010); Adam Mossoff, 
What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 395–97 (2003). 
  23  See, e.g., Benito Arruñada, Property Titling and Conveyancing, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 237, 237–40 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 
2011); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: 
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perspectives.  Consider, for example, the recent resurgence of interest 
in the numerus clausus; this principle that property forms come in a 
finite and closed menu can be added onto the bundle theory as a 
“menu” of collections of sticks.24  Bundle theorists can accommodate 
this development.25  But they are being reactive in this regard: it is 
hard to say that the bundle picture would have led anyone to view the 
numerus clausus as important in the common law. 
In this Article, I present a theory that aims higher.  At the most 
basic level, the extreme bundle picture takes too little account of the 
costs of delineating rights.  The stick-by-stick, party-by-party “com-
plete” method of delineation is a nonstarter.  Delineation involves de-
fining the object of property, specifying the legal interests in it, and 
providing notice to the relevant parties, including duty bearers and en-
forcers.  If so, then we need a theory of starting points and shortcuts 
over the hypothetical complete but infeasible system.  As I also argue, 
once we do take the costs of delineation — information costs in partic-
ular — into account, then the baselines of traditional property, includ-
ing property as a right to a thing, become easier to understand and to 
justify. 
Relatedly, if property is more than a collection of sticks, then a the-
ory of property must address how the features of property relate to 
each other.  Many aspects of property are only fully describable at the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Y ALE L.J. 1, 8 (2000); Smith, supra note 8, at S454–55; see 
also Peter Lee, The Accession Insight and Patent Infringement Remedies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 175, 
190, 199–200 (2011); Christopher M. Newman, Patent Infringement as Nuisance, 59 CATH. U. L. 
REV.  61, 93–120 ( 2009); Note, A Justification for Allowing Fragmentation in Copyright,  124 
HARV. L. REV. 1751, 1755–63 (2011). 
  24  See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 V AND. 
L.  REV.  1597,  1597–1603 ( 2008); Avihay Dorfman, Property and Collective Undertaking: The 
Principle of Numerus Clausus, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 467, 491–95 (2011); Henry Hansmann & 
Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the 
Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373, S416–17 (2002); Michael A. Heller, The Bounda-
ries of Private Property, 108 Y ALE L.J. 1163, 1193–94 (1999); Merrill & Smith, supra note 23, at 
3–9; Francesco Parisi, Entropy in Property, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 595, 595–96 (2002); Joseph Wil-
liam Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1009, 1023–29 (2009). 
  25  See Davidson, supra note 24, at 1605 (“[B]undles retain great flexibility, but are nonetheless 
standardized.”).  It is worth noting that the bundle picture has had little currency outside the 
United States.  There are faint echoes in the Commonwealth, but the most famous exposition of 
the bundle by an English scholar was oriented toward finding universal features of ownership in 
mature legal systems.  See A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 
107, 107, 113 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961) (analyzing ownership in a “mature legal system” by isolating 
eleven elements); see also Chang & Smith,  supra note 1, at 14 n.31,  17–18; J.E. Penner, The 
“Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 737 (1996) (“Honoré was con-
cerned to show that there were common features or standard incidents of ownership that did not 
‘vary from system to system in the erratic, unpredictable way implied by some writers but, on the 
contrary, have a tendency to remain constant from place to place and age to age.’” (quoting 
Honoré, supra, at 109)).    
2012]  PROPERTY AS THE LAW OF THINGS  1699 
 
level of the property system as a whole, and some of property’s desira-
ble (and undesirable) effects emerge holistically.  The right to exclude, 
the residual claim, and so on are not detachable sticks serving detach-
able purposes.  They are integral — but not absolute — aspects of 
property that follow from its architecture.  That architecture responds 
in turn to the problem of managing the complexity of interactions be-
tween private parties with respect to a variety of attributes of re-
sources in a world of positive delineation costs, or so I argue. 
The importance of explaining why structures are not otherwise 
than they are can be illustrated with an analogy to the study of lan-
guage.  Traditional grammarians studied languages like English and 
French, or even non-Indo-European languages, using the categories 
developed to describe Latin.  In describing a language in this fashion, 
one would focus on the differences between the language and Latin, 
whereas the similarities could be taken for granted.  For example, one 
would look for the traditional parts of speech (noun, adjective, verb), 
and sometimes even the cases (nominative, genitive, accusative, dative, 
and ablative), as a starting point for analysis.  The great innovation of 
modern linguistics, from structuralism to generative grammar, was to 
take less for granted, in a radical way.26  Not only is Latin a complete-
ly arbitrary starting point for cross-linguistic analysis, but we need to 
step back even further.  If all languages have a certain feature but lan-
guages could have been otherwise, that is a fact worth explaining.  In 
other words, we want to explain why universal structures are univer-
sal and why we do not find the ones that are universally absent. 
I argue that the New Private Law and realist-derived approaches 
stand in a similar relationship, only with the New Private Law in the 
role of generative grammar and legal realism in the role of traditional 
grammar.  If one bundle is in principle as expected as another and the 
theory that leads us to select one bundle over another is informed 
mainly by the benefits to be attained, there is little to explain why we 
have entitlements in the form of rights. 
Something similar to the shift to more explanatory modes in lin-
guistics also happened in institutional economics.  It was once very 
easy — and common — to take for granted transaction costs as well as 
the institutions they gave rise to.  The importance of Ronald Coase’s 
work was to show that the world would look very different without 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  26  For example, the approach aims to be less language-specific.  See, e.g., WILLIAM CROFT, 
SYNTACTIC  CATEGORIES  AND  GRAMMATICAL  RELATIONS ( 1991); GERALD  GAZDAR  ET 
AL., GENERALIZED  PHRASE  STRUCTURE  GRAMMAR ( 1985); Noam Chomsky, Remarks on 
Nominalization, in READINGS IN ENGLISH TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR 184 (Roderick 
A. Jacobs & Peter S. Rosenbaum eds., 1970); András Kornai & Geoffrey K. Pullum, The X-bar 
Theory of Phrase Structure, 66 LANGUAGE 24 (1990).     
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transaction costs.27  Devices like firms exist in the first place because 
of the costs of transacting outside versus inside the firm.28  The irony 
is that Coase adopted an extreme version of the bundle picture.29  In a 
sense, the New Private Law can be seen as adopting the Coasean per-
spective, taking institutional constraints seriously as a source of expla-
nation of what we do and do not find, and then turning the perspec-
tive onto the notion of property itself.30  Property itself could and 
would be otherwise in the absence of transaction costs. 
By contrast, the bundle view, I claim, fails to be a theory.  There is 
a basic architecture of property, and many features of property follow 
from it.  They can be tweaked, but they are not as detachable as the 
bundle view would have it.  Property is a holistic system made up of 
interactive components, not a system in which anything can in princi-
ple relate to anything else.  Further, property law provides for actual 
bundles of rights (or legal relations) that exhibit features relating to 
their completeness not captured as the sum of their parts.  No reason-
able version of the bundle view, thankfully, fully exploits uncon-
strained interactivity, and that is the point: the bundle-of-sticks picture 
does not explain the organization and structure of property, but seems 
to take it for granted.  Property as a bundle of sticks could be a partial 
outlook, but is not a theory. 
II.  THINGS AS MODULES 
The alternative to the bundle should not be a return to prerealism 
or to pure doctrinalism.  Unreflective conceptualism or formalism is a 
nonstarter and is not what the New Private Law is about.  Here, I 
present an alternative to the bundle picture that I call an architectural 
or modular theory of property.  This theory responds to information 
costs — it conceives of property as a law of modular “things.” 
In this Part, I focus on one aspect of modularity in property: the 
contribution that things make to the operation of property law.  Many 
aspects of property law may well operate as semiautonomous devices, 
and the whole idea of differential formalism leads us to expect that the 
property system as a whole will be modular in this sense.  Modules 
may overlap too: one need not expect that there is some physical or 
metaphorical space that a component of the property system must in-
habit.  Rather, following recent developments in cognitive science, I 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  27  Coase, supra note 16, at 15. 
  28  See generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
  29  Merrill & Smith, supra note 6, at 12–23. 
  30  Id. at 29–42; Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2083, 2090–2103 (2009).    
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would expect that modules be defined by their function.31  But I focus 
on the modularity of things and, by extension, the legal relations de-
fined in terms of them, which are among the most straightforwardly 
modular and most basic aspects of the property system. 
A.  Property as a Nearly Decomposable System 
Modularity is key to managing complexity.  A system is complex 
when it has many interdependencies.  In a nonmodular system any 
change to any element can in principle impact another element direct-
ly, or through any path, however long.  This pattern of dense interde-
pendencies makes such systems either unpredictable if changed, or ex-
cessively rigid in order to avoid unpredictable change from these ripple 
effects.32  Complex systems often have clusters whose elements have 
dense and intense interactions among themselves but relatively sparse 
interactions with elements outside the cluster; such systems are what 
Herbert Simon termed “nearly decomposable.”33  A nearly decompos-
able system allows chunks or components of the system to be partially 
walled off and the interconnections between these chunks and the rest 
of the system to be deliberately limited (sometimes even at the expense 
of interdependencies that might have some value).34  In such systems 
we can impose a modular structure that encapsulates the clusters — 
that is, hides much of their internal information — and defines the in-
teractions of clusters through their interfaces.  Modularity manages 
complexity, because the ripple effects of modifications to one module 
have more defined consequences (through interfaces) than they would 
in an unconstrained system.  Think about a car: changes in the brake 
system mostly do not affect the fuel injection system and vice versa.  
By ruling out such interactions, the system is easier to understand and 
to modify, and less vulnerable to shocks.  Interactions and interde-
pendencies can be intense within such modules but are defined and 
relatively sparse across the interface with other modules.35  The key is 
that the interface allows only certain information through; the rest is 
“hidden” in the module. 
Consider some examples of modularity from organizations.36  A  
simple premodern example would be a team of smiths making an iron 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  31  See, e.g., H. Clark Barrett & Robert Kurzban, Modularity in Cognition: Framing the De-
bate, 113 PSYCHOL. REV. 628, 629–30 (2006) (reviewing the modularity-of-mind debate). 
  32  1 CARLISS Y. BALDWIN & KIM B. CLARK, DESIGN RULES: THE POWER OF MODULAR-
ITY 58–59, 236–37, 257 (2000). 
  33  HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 210 (2d ed. 1981). 
  34  See id. at 209–11.  See generally BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 32. 
  35  See SIMON, supra note 33, at 198–99. 
  36  These examples are drawn from Carliss Y. Baldwin, Where Do Transactions Come From? 
Modularity, Transactions, and the Boundaries of Firms, 17 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 155, 166–
74 (2007).    
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pothook for a team of cooks.  Within each team, the members interact 
intensively on the production process.  But the smith-cook system is 
nearly decomposable into a smith module and a cook module.37  At the 
interface, the design specifications of the pothook (strength, resistance 
to heat, size, shape) travel from cooks to smiths (along with payment), 
and the pothook travels in the reverse direction.38  All the other details 
of the production process are relevant only within the smith module, 
and the details of how the hook is used in cooking food are relevant 
only within the cook module.39  Activities in each module can take 
place independently as long as the interface conditions — notably the 
design parameters of the pothook — are respected.40  An innovation 
within one team module can take place without that team’s worrying 
about ripple effects on the other team.  To take a more recent and 
more complex example, the production of a laptop with a disk drive 
involves multiple teams that interact much more intensively than the 
smiths and cooks.41  Nevertheless, modularity can play some role in 
creating options for flexible actions within teams in this more complex 
setting.  Because the interaction across interfaces is more intense, inter-
faces may require more elaborate transactions and even formal con-
tracts to govern potential opportunistic behavior.42  Modularity is a 
key design principle in many areas and is important in evolutionary 
theory, cognitive science, and computer hardware and software, as 
well as in engineering and architecture. 
B.  The Modular Things of Property 
The modular theory is more explanatory than the bundle picture.  
It helps explain the structures we do not find, shows how property can 
be used to maximize option value, and demonstrates why innovation 
in property takes the institutional paths it does. 
Because it makes sense in modern property systems to delegate to 
owners a choice from a range of uses and because protection allows for 
stability, appropriability, facilitation of planning and investment, liber-
ty, and autonomy, we typically start with an exclusion strategy — and 
that goes not just for private property but for common and public 
property as well.43  “Use” can include nonconsumptive uses relating to 
conservation.  The exclusion strategy defines a chunk of the world — a 
thing — under the owner’s control, and much of the information about 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  37  See id. at 166–67. 
  38  See id. at 167–68. 
  39  See id. at 168. 
  40  See id. at 167–68. 
  41  See id. at 169–70. 
  42  See id. at 172–74. 
  43  See generally Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719 (2004).    
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the thing’s uses, their interactions, and the user is irrelevant to the out-
side world.44  Duty bearers know not to enter Blackacre without per-
mission or not to take cars, without needing to know what the owner 
is using the thing for, who the owner is, who else might have rights 
and other interests, and so on.  But dividing the world into chunks is 
not enough: spillovers and scale problems call for more specific rules to 
deal with problems like odors and lateral support, and to facilitate co-
ordination (for example, covenants, common interest communities, and 
trusts).45  These governance strategies focus more closely on narrower 
classes of use and sometimes make more specific reference to their 
purposes, and so they are more contextual.46 
The exclusion-governance architecture manages complexity in a 
way totally uncaptured by the bundle picture, and importantly, the 
former is modular while the latter is not.  The exclusion strategy de-
fines what a thing is to begin with.  A fundamental question is how to 
classify “things,” and, hence, which aspects of “things” are the most 
basic units of property law.  Many important features of property fol-
low from the semitransparent boundaries between things.  Boundaries 
carve up the world into semiautonomous components — modules — 
that permit private law to manage highly complex interactions among 
private parties. 
Property clusters complementary attributes — land’s soil nutrients, 
moisture, building support, or parts of everyday objects like chairs — 
into the parcels of real estate or tangible and intangible objects of per-
sonal property.  It then employs information-hiding and limited inter-
faces to manage complexity.  For example, if a car is not mine, I do not 
need to know who owns it, whether it is subject to a security interest 
or lease, and so forth, in order to know not to take or damage it.47  
When A sells the car to B, many features of A and B are irrelevant to 
each other, and most are irrelevant to in rem duty holders, who only 
need know not to steal the car.  Many details about A and B are irrel-
evant to their successors in interest.  In the case of negotiable property 
(cash being the extreme example), most information about predecessors 
in interest is irrelevant to the current holder: one can gain good title to 
cash even from a thief.  Because we want money to be easy to evaluate 
and to plug into transactions, it is the most modular property of all. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  44  See Smith, supra note 8, at S469; Henry E. Smith, Community and Custom in Property, 10 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 5, 17 (2009) [hereinafter Smith, Community and Custom in Proper-
ty].  The definition of a legal thing is facilitated by the identification of separable collections of 
resource attributes.  See, e.g., PENNER, supra note 5, at 105–27; Michael J. Madison, Law as De-
sign: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381, 417–19 (2005); Emily 
Sherwin, Two- and Three-Dimensional Property Rights, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1075, 1080–92 (1997). 
  45  See Smith, supra note 8, at S470. 
  46  See id. at S455. 
  47  PENNER, supra note 5, at 75.    
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Again, property works the same way.  When O1 owns Blackacre, 
the exclusion strategy for delineating her rights, implemented through 
devices like the tort of trespass, protects a range of actions A1,  A2, 
A3, . . . , without the law’s needing to specify these actions.  Indeed, 
O1 may know more about the actions than anyone else.  Action A2 
may result in a nuisance to O2, who owns neighboring Whiteacre, and 
O3, who owns Greenacre.  But O1 can take actions A1, A3, . . . , with-
out consulting or needing to coordinate with O2 or O3.  O1 can delay 
taking an action until the optimal time.  In other words, the modular 
architecture, by reducing the dependency of actions A1, A3, . . . , on el-
ements outside the Blackacre module, preserves options in O1.  By 
contrast, if more of the set of A1, A2, A3, . . . , depended on actions in 
the corresponding sets of O2 and O3 or yet other persons, A1 would 
have to be determined at a time that compromises between the need 
for decision on O1’s part and the timing of those other persons’ related 
actions.  Moreover, as a thing of modular property, Blackacre can easi-
ly be transferred from O1 to others because nothing in the specification 
of the package makes it context-dependent on the status of the owner.  
Likewise, nonowners of Blackacre — everyone other than O1 — have 
less to be on the lookout for, and need not make their decisions and 
their timing depend in any way on A1, A3, and so forth, in O1’s set.48 
The modular theory explains property’s structure, which includes 
providing some reason why those structures are not otherwise.  In a 
zero-transaction-cost world, we could use all governance all the time, 
whether supplied by government or through super fine-grained con-
tracting among all the concerned parties.49  That is not our world, and 
the main point of exclusion as a delineation strategy is that it is a 
shortcut over direct delineation of this more “complete” set of legal re-
lations.  Analytically, it might be interesting to think of property as a 
list of use rights availing pairwise between all people in society, but ac-
tually creating such a list would be a potentially intractable problem in 
our world.  On the other hand, exclusion is not the whole story either.  
Causes of action like trespass implement a right to exclude, but the 
right to exclude is not why we have property.50  Rather, the right to ex-
clude is part of how property works.  Rights to exclude are a means to 
an end, and the ends in property relate to people’s interests in using 
things. 
The architecture of property emerges from the process of solving 
the problem of how to serve use interests in a roughly cost-effective 
way.  In modern societies, the solution usually involves first the appli-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  48  For how property creates options through modularity, see Smith, supra note 30, at 2104–13. 
  49  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 6 (manuscript at 32–33). 
  50  See sources cited supra note 5.    
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cation of a use-neutral exclusion strategy, and then refinement through 
contracts, regulations, common law doctrine, and norms.51  Exclusion 
is at the core of this architecture because it is a default, a convenient 
starting point.  Exclusion is not the most important or “core” value be-
cause it is not a value at all.  Thinking that exclusion is a value usually 
reflects the confusion of means and ends in property law: exclusion is a 
rough first cut — and only that — at serving the purposes of property.  
It is true that exclusion piggybacks on the everyday morality of “thou 
shalt not steal,” whereas governance reflects a more refined Golden-
Rule, “do unto others” type of morality in more personal contexts.52  It 
may be the case that our morality itself is shaped to a certain extent by 
the ease with which it can be communicated and enforced in more im-
personal settings.  I leave that question for another day.  But the point 
here is that the exclusion-governance architecture is compatible with a 
wide range of purposes for property.  Some societies will move from 
exclusion to governance — that is, some systems of laws and norms 
will focus more on individuated uses of resources — more readily than 
others, and will do so for different reasons than others.   
At the base of the architectural approach is a distinction that the 
bundle theory — along with other theories — tends to obscure: the dis-
tinction between the interests we have in using things and the devices 
the law uses to protect those interests.  Property serves purposes relat-
ed to use by employing a variety of delineation strategies.  Because de-
lineation costs are greater than zero, which strategy one uses and when 
one uses it will be dictated in part by the costs of delineation — not 
just by the benefits that correspond to the use-based purposes of prop-
erty.  To take a simple example, the benefits of multiple use must be 
compared with the cost of delineation.  Sometimes a fee simple in A 
and an easement in B will suffice, sometimes co-ownership by A and B 
will be required (a commons of A and B with an internal arrangement 
to coordinate use), and sometimes a complex mixture of common and 
private property — a semicommons — may be required, as in the open 
fields of medieval and early modern England.53  These very different 
arrangements combine different mixes of exclusion and governance.   
What one does not find is a totally piece-by-piece, synthetic bundle of 
use rights in A and B couched as a list of all the actions either individ-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  51  Cf. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 V A. L. REV. 
965, 1023–24 (2004) (explaining how the shift from exclusion to governance occurs within the law 
of nuisance). 
  52  See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1849, 1852, 1890–94 (2007). 
  53  See Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 131, 131–34 (2000).    
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ual could take that would impact the other, along with how to resolve 
the conflict.54 
The traditional definition of property is a right to a thing good 
against the world — it is an in rem right.  The special in rem character 
of property forms the basis of an information-cost explanation of the 
numerus clausus and standardization in property.55  In rem rights are 
directed at a wide and indefinite audience of duty holders and other 
affected parties, who would incur high information costs in dealing 
with idiosyncratic property rights and would have to process more 
types of information than they would in the absence of the numerus 
clausus.  Crucially, parties who might create such idiosyncratic proper-
ty rights are not guaranteed to take such third-party processing   
costs into account.  There is thus an information-cost externality, and 
the numerus clausus is one tool for addressing this externality.  Other 
devices include title records and technological changes in   
communication. 
Modules help contain third-party information costs.  I know not to 
enter Blackacre without permission and not to steal a car from a park-
ing lot without needing to know what the land or the car is being used 
for, how virtuous the owner is, or who (or what) the owner is.  Nor 
need courts delve into these matters.  The things defined by the basic 
exclusion strategy mediate the relations between often anonymous   
parties. 
More generally, situations between the fully in rem and the fully in 
personam present themselves, and a preliminary inquiry reveals that 
intermediate situations are handled with less formalism and less rigid 
standardization than in rem situations but do not allow the degree of 
customization possible in contract law.  As Thomas Merrill and I have 
shown, in rem rights avail against many parties, and those duty hold-
ers tend to be anonymous or indefinite.56  But rights can avail against 
duty holders that have only one of these properties: the class of duty 
holders may be large but definite, as in mass contracts, or the duty 
holders may be indefinite but not numerous, as with successors in in-
terest.  And each of the features — numerosity and indefiniteness — 
falls along a spectrum.57  Information costs rise as we increase 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  54  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 397–98.  Property systems in close-knit contexts can 
afford to delineate less in terms of exclusion and more in terms of use rights, but they face the 
same trade-off of intensive communication with a limited audience versus more formal messages 
directed at more extensive sets of duty bearers.  See, e.g., Smith, Community and Custom in Prop-
erty, supra note 44, at 12–24. 
  55  Merrill & Smith, supra note 23, at 8, 26–34.   
  56  Merrill & Smith, supra note 15, at 783–86.   
  57  On how these features fit into a communicative trade-off between intensity of information 
and extensiveness of audience, see Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and 
Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1148–57 (2003).    
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numerosity and indefiniteness.  In situations falling between in 
personam and in rem, we tend to find intermediate levels of 
mandatoriness and standardization.58  And in these situations, those 
aspects of the institution that implicate third parties are more formal 
and standardized than those that affect only smaller and more definite 
groups of people.  These intermediate approaches usually take the 
form of protective strategies, which make certain forms of legal rela-
tions difficult or prohibitive where we fear that the duty holders will 
not understand the content of the legal relation at reasonable cost.   
The implied warranty of habitability in landlord-tenant law, in which 
minimum standards (usually drawn from a local housing code) are 
read into leases as a warranty, protects tenants as purchasers of hous-
ing services.59  This interpretation of the implied warranty of habita-
bility makes it a close cousin of consumer protection law.  Other pro-
tective strategies exempt the potential duty holder from an obligation 
to inquire.  Thus, tortfeasors must respect property rights but have no 
duty to inquire into the contractual arrangements surrounding proper-
ty that the tortfeasor might damage (for example, tortfeasors are equal-
ly liable for damaging a rental car as they are for damaging an owned 
car).60  The other class of intermediate strategies also is reminiscent of 
consumer protection law: rules mandating the giving of notice.  So for 
example, equitable estates in trusts, which are mostly in personam 
(against the trustee), often cannot be enforced against third parties un-
less the third party has notice of the beneficial interest.  
Modularity plays a key role in making the standardization of prop-
erty possible.  First, modularity makes it possible to keep interconnec-
tions between packages of rights relatively few, thus allowing much of 
what goes on inside a package of property rights to be irrelevant to the 
outside world.  Second, property rights “mesh” with neighboring prop-
erty rights and show network effects with more far-flung property 
rights.  The outside interfaces make this possible at reasonable cost.  
Third, the processes of property are simple enough that they can feed 
into themselves.  Many modular structures are hierarchical in that they 
have modules composed of other modules.  This hierarchy happens by 
very regular rules because the modules themselves present a clean in-
terface.  Consider the system of estates and future interests.  Crucially, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  58  Merrill & Smith, supra note 15, at 803–09.  For a discussion of a range of further examples 
relating to property protection of contract rights that show this pattern of intermediate standardi-
zation in situations between the in rem and in personam, see generally P.G. Turner, Proprietary 
Modes of Protecting the Performance Interest in Contract (July 2011) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
  59  Merrill & Smith, supra note 15, at 825–27. 
  60  See Henry E. Smith, Modularity and Morality in the Law of Torts, J. TORT L., no. 2, art. 5, 
Oct. 2011, at 25–28.    
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they have the property of recursion: the interests can nest within them-
selves, as where a life estate is followed by a remainder in life estate 
followed by a remainder in life estate, and so forth, followed by a re-
mainder (in fee simple).  Generally, a small set of rules (as small as one 
rule) can generate an infinite set of outputs if one of the rules is recur-
sive (that is, it can apply to its own output, or, in other words, the rule 
feeds itself).61  Many linguists take it to be true of natural language 
that a finite grammar can capture the infinite set of sentences of a lan-
guage like English in part because some rules, such as the rule that 
forms subordinate clauses, can be repeatedly used on themselves: Pat 
said that Chris believed that the cat is sick.62  Property forms have a 
LEGO-like interface with each other that allows the generation of 
complex structures out of a small set of simple parts.  In this respect, 
property forms are like a basic grammar or “pattern language” of 
property.63  Property has this self-feeding or recursive aspect along 
multiple dimensions.  Not only can we create nested sets of interests, 
but we can also subdivide parcels and subdivide them further.  Proper-
ty can be fragmented, and the law limits the types of fragmentation.  
But because of recursion, even this limited fragmentation allows for 
great flexibility in creating complex but modular structures.  Modulari-
ty and its standardization of the “outsides” of property packages allow 
achievement of a wide range of objectives (lowering frustration costs), 
while keeping information costs under control, relative to a system of 
more tailored packages.64 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  61  For an engaging introduction to recursion, see DOUGLAS  R.  HOFSTADTER, GÖDEL, 
ESCHER, BACH 127–57 (1979).  See also, e.g., JOSEPH R. SHOENFIELD, RECURSION THEORY 
(photo. reprint 2001) (1993). 
  62  See, e.g., IVAN A. SAG & THOMAS WASOW, SYNTACTIC THEORY: A FORMAL INTRO-
DUCTION 36, 259 (1999).  Despite the conventional wisdom to the contrary, infinitude is not an 
empirically demonstrated fact about natural language, and the need for recursion in syntax is 
loosely related at best to the creativeness of language.  See Geoffrey K. Pullum & Barbara C. 
Scholz,  Recursion and the Infinitude Claim,  in R ECURSION  AND  HUMAN  LANGUAGE  113 
(Harry van der Hulst ed., 2010). 
  63  The notion of a “pattern language” has been influential in architecture.  See CHRISTOPHER 
ALEXANDER ET AL., A PATTERN LANGUAGE: TOWNS, BUILDINGS, AND CONSTRUCTION 
(1977).  More generally, what I am suggesting is that property has an architecture, so the analogy 
is quite apt.  Furthermore, modularity serves a very similar role in all fields where an “architec-
ture” is used to manage complexity, including most clearly computer hardware and software.  See 
SIMON, supra note 33, at 209–17; see also BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 32, at 5–11.  See gen-
erally CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER, NOTES ON THE SYNTHESIS OF FORM (1964) (exploring 
design principles from mathematics and logic in particular). 
  64  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 23, at 38–42; Smith, supra note 57, at 1139–48.  See general-
ly Henry E. Smith, Standardization in Property Law,  in R ESEARCH  HANDBOOK  ON  THE 
ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 23, at 148 [hereinafter Smith, Standardization in 
Property Law].    
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C.  The Structure of Property 
The modular theory analyzes property into features, but these fea-
tures are not just a collection, unlike the sticks in the bundle picture.  
Far from denying that property has “features,” the modular theory 
seeks to show how they emerge and how they relate to one another.  
By analogy, one could analyze a diamond as a collection of carbon at-
oms.  A diamond does consist of carbon atoms, but there is a lot more 
to a diamond.  The relations among the atoms help distinguish it from 
graphite.  A diamond’s hardness and light dispersion are emergent 
properties from the overall structure.  The bundle-of-rights picture of 
property treats property in atom-counting fashion, which is fine as far 
as it goes.  But what we still need is a theory of how the pieces fit  
together. 
The exclusion-governance architecture of property sets up a plat-
form that presumptively provides a simple package whose features 
need minimal delineation because they come along for the ride.  These 
features can be grouped into basic features, secondary features, and 
higher-level features. 
1.  Basic Features. — The basic features are the in rem aspect of 
property, the right to exclude, and the residual claim.  None of these 
features is absolute, but their perceived centrality to property is no ac-
cident either.65 
Property is in rem.  It gives an owner control over uses of a thing 
by defining the thing in an on/off manner that indirectly relates to 
those uses, thereby sending a simple message to outsiders to respect the 
boundary — the in rem aspect of property.66  Modular things are suit-
ed for sending an “in rem” message.  The need for far-flung and some-
times socially distant persons to respect property rights calls for simpli-
fication and standardization.67  The optimal combination of such 
standardization and notice-giving devices (like land records) is an em-
pirical question.68 
In the right to exclude, the owner has the gatekeeper right over the 
boundary and can permit or reject potential licensees, lessees, and the 
like.69  Again, there is no interest in exclusion, but exclusion strategies 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  65  For an analysis that places the in rem aspect, the right to exclude, and the ability to run to 
successors as “sine qua non” features that automatically follow from property as a structured 
bundle of legal relations, see Chang & Smith, supra note 1, at 28–34.  
  66  See Smith, supra note 57, at 1111–12; Smith, Standardization in Property Law, supra note 
64, at 149–50. 
  67  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 23, at 24–42. 
  68  See id. at 50–51; Smith, Standardization in Property Law, supra note 64, at 166–67. 
  69  See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 21, at 30–32; PENNER, supra note 5, at 68–74; Larissa Katz, 
Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 289–90 (2008); Merrill, 
supra note 21, at 731; Smith, supra note 8, at S469.  Trespass is a sovereignty-based tort.  See gen-
erally Arthur Ripstein, Beyond the Harm Principle, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215 (2006).  For use-
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indirectly protect interests in use.  The exclusion strategy implemented 
as a right to exclude is at the core of the mechanism property uses to 
serve owners’ and society’s real interests.  The right to exclude does 
not require an owner, whether it be an individual, a group, or the 
state, to actually exclude others; the gatekeeper can decide to include.  
Nor does the fact that a right to exclude follows automatically from 
the organization of modular things through an exclusion strategy mean 
that the right to exclude is absolute.  The system of interactions be-
tween persons with respect to things is nearly decomposable — not to-
tally decomposable.  Modules in property law have rich interfaces; 
they are not windowless monads. 
Property is often identified with the residual claim as well.70  The 
uses inside the boundaries usually need not be separately delineated: 
the exclusionary protection of uses automatically includes unspecified 
uses that the proxy sweeps in — giving rise to the residual claim.  De-
fining a thing, then carving out specific rights, and leaving the residual 
behind is more cost-effective than delineating sticks and then grouping 
some into a big bundle called the residual.  As its name suggests, the 
residual claim is bound up tightly with the delineation of a thing. 
None of these features — the in rem aspect, the right to exclude, 
and the residual claim — is absolute.  At some cost, specific people in 
the large and indefinite set of in rem duty bearers can be singled out 
for special treatment.  As for the right to exclude, O can give A an 
easement, and necessity law can give A the right to enter to save his 
life (think cabin in the woods after an avalanche).  The exceptions and 
limitations on the right to exclude are also limitations on the in rem 
status of the right and the residual claim.  Why?  Because governance 
strategies — implemented by nuisance law, covenants, and regula-
tions — take exclusion as a platform and modify its features when it is 
important to do so.  It is no accident that governance impacts in rem 
status, the right to exclude, and the residual claim at the same time: 
the basic features of property are not sticks, but automatic, presump-
tive features of an exclusionary modular strategy. 
2.  Secondary features. — The secondary features follow from the 
decontextualization of the exclusion strategy.  They are alienability, 
persistence, and compatibility.  The point of defining things on the ba-
sis of exclusionary proxies is that uses and attributes on the “inside” 
are complementary, but the need to track connections between inside 
attributes and the outside world can be limited to those connections 
built into the interface between modules (which correspond to the most 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
based critiques of emphasizing exclusion, see, for example, Claeys, supra note 21, at 17–28; 
Mossoff, supra note 22, at 395–97.  
  70  See, e.g., YORAM  BARZEL, ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  OF  PROPERTY  RIGHTS  3 ( 2d ed. 
1997).    
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important spillover effects).  The decontextualization means that in 
property we try to keep the interface simple and standardized (for ex-
ample, through the numerus clausus principle) and ration its complexi-
ty.  Property law is formal in the sense of relative invariance (not com-
plete invariance) to context.71  What are the implications of formalism? 
First, the formalism of the exclusion strategy and modesty in the 
governance strategy make property more alienable.  If property rights 
interlock, they will vary upon their “transport” to a new owner to 
serve new uses.  For example, making the history of transactions in-
volving a piece of property less relevant, as through negotiability rules, 
facilitates alienability.  As noted earlier, strong examples would be 
checks and cash. 
By contrast, property rights in common pools or even water rights 
in prior appropriation systems are necessarily connected to the charac-
teristics of other users and their rights, making those rights much 
harder to detach and less property-like than prototypical property.   
Because of its fluid nature, it is more difficult to treat water as a thing, 
and exclusion strategies play a correspondingly lesser role.72  Even the 
law of prior appropriation is more based on governance of uses than is 
usually appreciated.  Because water rights are more contextual in their 
definition (have a richer interface with other rights), most prominently 
in allowing downstream appropriators to gain rights to return flows, 
transfers of water rights are correspondingly trickier than most other 
types of property transfers. 
Even more so than with water, it is possible but difficult to treat in-
formation as a thing — that is, to find an on/off proxy for violation of 
rights to that information.73  As with water and other resources calling 
for interacting rights that cannot be spatially separated, one finds a 
mixture of common and private rights — a semicommons reflecting a 
system that is less decomposable than in the prototypical real property 
situation.74  In semicommons and purer commons, the governance 
rules that permit effective use of the resource may make redeployment 
more difficult as conditions change. 
Second, formalism in property promotes the feature of persistence.  
Defining a simple baseline of entitlement makes a property right easier 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  71  Cf. Francis Heylighen, Advantages and Limitations of Formal Expression, 4 FOUND. SCI. 
25, 27, 49–53 (1999) (defining formalism in language); Smith, supra note 57, at 1112–13, 1135–36 
(discussing “differential formalism,” the concept that formalism is a matter of degree). 
  72  See Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights,  50 
ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 448–49 (2008). 
  73  Smith, supra note 5, at 1792–98; see also Balganesh, supra note 21, at 627–28. 
  74  See Robert A. Heverly, The Information Semicommons, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1127, 
1164–83 (2003); Smith, supra note 53, at 131–32; see also James Grimmelmann, The Internet Is a 
Semicommons, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2799, 2799–2800 (2010).    
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to trace through proceeds and into remote hands.75  For example, 
when a thief steals a diamond, sells it for cash, and uses the cash to bet 
successfully at the racetrack, the victim of the theft can try to get the 
diamond back or can go after the thief to compel the thief to disgorge 
the “victim’s” money plus the proceeds.76  Defining things makes iden-
tification easier. 
Relatedly, the issue of whether a right — for example, a cove-
nant — runs to successors can be regarded as one of persistence.  If so, 
then perhaps doctrines like “touch and concern” might furnish the 
formalism that makes them easier to use as modifications of the basic 
package of rights in land.77 
Third, formalism and modularity promote compatibility of rights.  
Joining parcels of land generally is not a problem because the legal re-
lations associated with them do not conflict.  Compatibility has been a 
problem in intellectual property, where licenses may indeed conflict 
more easily.  In open-access licensing, a problem has arisen where a  
license requires that incorporating works be licensed on the same 
terms as the incorporated works.78  If another component of the work 
has a similar restriction that is not otherwise identical, a conflict may 
arise.  If this incompatibility is a large enough problem, it points   
away from a contractarian model and toward greater property-like   
standardization.79 
A particular kind of compatibility leads to systemic scalability, tak-
en up in the next section.  Parcels are largely associated with reciprocal 
rights and duties, and larger combined parcels easily inherit the fea-
tures of the smaller parcels that have been joined together and present 
the same face to the world as the old collection did.  Joining parcel A 
and parcel B means the new parcel has the same sets of rights and du-
ties in nuisance with respect to neighbors, the same rights and duties 
of lateral support, and so on.80 
3.  Higher-level architectural features. — Modularity also promotes 
higher-level architectural features — recursion, scalability, and resili-
ence — that preserve options and make property more useful.  It bears 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  75  See Smith, supra note 30, at 2116 n.111.  On “persistent rights,” see BEN MCFARLANE, 
THE STRUCTURE OF PROPERTY LAW 364–423 (2008). 
  76  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 59 (2011). 
  77  Alternatively, the ability of a right to run with assets might be regarded as a basic feature of 
property.  Chang & Smith, supra note 1, at 23–24. 
  78  See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 943–46 (2008); 
see also Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facili-
tating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 413–14 (2005); Zachary Katz, Pitfalls of 
Open Licensing: An Analysis of Creative Commons Licensing, 46 IDEA 391, 391 (2006).  
  79  See Van Houweling, supra note 78, at 938–39. 
  80  Where this compatibility is not present, major problems can ensue.  For example, the law 
seeks to prevent manipulation of riparian parcels to maximize the benefits of “reasonable use.”    
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emphasizing how these features are emergent: they emerge from the 
modular property system. 
First, property rights are recursive, as discussed earlier.  The rules 
for dividing property can feed themselves (life estate followed by a re-
mainder in life estate, followed by a remainder in life estate,  .  .  . ), 
making the system highly generative and able to capture an infinite set 
of structures with a small set of rules.  Even defining modular things is 
a recursive process, as is the case with trusts of trust rights.  As in oth-
er systems, recursion is an important property that increases the power 
of the system despite a relatively small number of rules. 
Second, property rights are scalable, as is dramatically true in the 
rectangular survey system and in the case of combined (or divided) 
plots mentioned earlier.81  Scalability is the systemic consequence of a 
certain kind of compatibility of components, in which features of the 
whole are inherited from its parts.  The rights and duties of owners 
under nuisance and lateral support scale up and down.  Large or 
small, whole or divided, rectangular parcels have the same geometry 
and ease of location in the rectangular survey system. 
Third, property rights are robust and resilient.  Events like a local 
odor affect property owners in a small radius, without upsetting larger 
sets of legal relations.82  All the divisions, combinations, contracting, 
and so forth, are largely limited in their effects to the owners and those 
in privity with them, again because of the modular structure of proper-
ty.  As in other arenas, modularity preserves options, because decisions 
over small numbers of components can be made at the optimal time 
without worrying about far-flung ripple effects.83 
D.  Exclusion, Governance, and Safety Valves 
In property law, the exclusion strategy is implemented through a 
variety of doctrines that work in tandem.  Trespass, as traditionally 
defined, is a voluntary crossing of a boundary of a parcel by means of 
a visible object.84  The boundary is defined by a system of surveying 
and the ad coelum rule, which makes the boundary extend to the space 
above and below the parcel.85  Some of the more on/off aspects of the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  81  Cf. Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, Land Demarcation Systems, in RESEARCH HAND-
BOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 23, at 257, 285–87 (describing the 
establishment and coordination advantages of the rectangular survey). 
  82  See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & 
PROC.) 347, 350 (1967); Ellickson, supra note 8, at 1323–32. 
  83  BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 32, at 90–91, 234–37, 256–62. 
  84  See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES  AND POLI-
CIES 938–48 (2007). 
  85  The full maxim, cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos, translates as “one 
who owns the soil owns also to the sky and to the depths.”  See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 
U.S. 256,  260–61 (1946) (discussing how high-altitude flights do not violate landowners’ rights 
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law of nuisance likewise implement an exclusion strategy.86  Robust 
remedies like injunctions back up trespass and (to a lesser extent) nui-
sance, while disgorgement and punitive damages also back up tres-
pass.  Thus, if someone enters land, there is a trespass.  If a company 
deliberately drags a mobile home across a snowy field over the objec-
tion of the owner, punitive damages might be available.87 
But many problematic interactions are not solvable using bound-
aries and are important enough to call for enriching the interface be-
tween property modules.  Much of the law of nuisance is prototypical: 
offensive odors, vibrations, and smoke particles disturb wide classes of 
normal uses of adjacent parcels and may be enjoined or give rise to li-
ability for damages.  Even more detailed are covenants and zoning, 
which are provided by the parties themselves and the government, re-
spectively.  For example, rules about building heights and door colors 
are part of a governance regime at the interface between property in 
parcels, which is supplied in part by parties and in part off the rack 
though regulation.  In other work, I have addressed the problem of 
figuring out when to shift from exclusion to governance.88  In princi-
ple, the costs and benefits of singling out particular uses for particular 
treatment are measurable, making for a straightforward application of 
microeconomic analysis.  In practice, however, many of the considera-
tions are not measurable,89 leading to a need for legal designers to 
combine rough guesses, presumptions that have worked in successful 
legal systems, and rules of thumb about when to look to custom as a 
source of law.90 
Part of the system importantly involves safety valves, which make 
possible property’s simple structures.  Law from before the realist era 
is often misinterpreted as involving wooden and remorseless applica-
tion — furnishing a reason to rip it up rather than to reform it.  Build-
ing encroachments and nuisances will illustrate.  For building en-
croachments, the law of trespass is clear: an invasion by a visible 
object voluntarily put there is a trespass.  Moreover, it is a continuous 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
under ad coelum doctrine); Brown v. United States, 73 F.3d 1100, 1103–04 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (revers-
ing grant of summary judgment for the government in case of military overflights because of gen-
uine issue about substantial interference with owner’s recreational use of land); Edwards v. Sims, 
24 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Ky. 1929) (applying ad coelum doctrine to cave); see also MERRILL & SMITH, 
supra note 84, at 9–15, 175–83; Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Deter-
mining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 35–36 (1985). 
  86  Smith, supra note 51, at 975–90; see also Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Jus-
tice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 53–56 (1979). 
  87  See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Wis. 1997). 
  88  See generally, e.g., Smith, supra note 8. 
  89  See id. at S467–78. 
  90  See id. at S477 (rough guesses); Smith, supra note 51, at 1021–45 (presumptions); Smith, 
Community and Custom in Property, supra note 44, at 12–24 (custom).    
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trespass and so is presumptively a candidate for an injunction.  Ac-
cording to a false view of earlier law, the result would be a senseless, 
wooden issuance of an automatic injunction.91  Instead, equity would 
provide a limited safety valve in situations of disproportionate hard-
ship (where the benefit of the injunction to the victim would be slight 
compared to the cost to the defendant), sometimes called “undue hard-
ship.”92  (Likewise, the encroached-upon party’s unclean hands would 
disqualify that party from obtaining an injunction.)  Nevertheless, if 
the encroachment was in bad faith — meaning, done knowingly — the 
equitable safety valve would not apply, and the injunction would is-
sue.  The structure is a simple one and tailored to the problem of po-
tential opportunism on both sides.93  It makes those undertaking a 
building project responsible but not paranoid, which is probably the 
best one can expect.94  Importantly, the equitable safety valve makes 
the simple baselines of the common law less vulnerable to opportun-
ists.95  A similar story can be told for nuisance.  Contrary to the myth 
that Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.96 relaxed an automatic injunction 
rule in nuisance cases,97 the equitable defense of undue hardship was 
always part of the law’s treatment of nuisances.98  Nuisance depends 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  91  Pile v. Pedrick, 31 A. 646 (Pa. 1895), which granted an injunction where defendant, acting 
in good faith, had erected a foundation wall that extended onto plaintiffs’ property by one and a 
half inches, id. at 646, is sometimes used to illustrate the phenomenon of automatic injunctions.  
But it is far from clear how representative this case is.  Controversy over a party wall may have 
shaped the suit, and the court may have granted a longer time for compliance and employed its 
discretion over cost-shifting in order to force a settlement.  I thank Brian Lee for sharing with me 
his insights into the case.  At any rate, someone suffering a good faith encroachment would not be 
entitled to an injunction if he were subject to a defense of unclean hands or laches.  The real 
question is how disproportionate or undue hardship was treated in routine pre-twentieth-century 
encroachment cases. 
  92  See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Neglected Defense of Undue Hardship (and the Doctrinal 
Train Wreck in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement), 4 J. TORT L. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at  
2–7); see also Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Acci-
dental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 226 (2012).  
For a development of the safety valve idea in the context of accession doctrine, see Yun-chien 
Chang, An Economic Analysis of the Accession Doctrine: A Case for the Property Rule 4, 16 (Feb. 
11, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1576426. 
  93  Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity 3–6 (Oct. 22,  2010)  
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LEO/Hsmith 
_LawVersusEquity7.pdf. 
  94  For an argument in favor of use of damages based on excessive private benefits of inquiry 
into boundaries, see Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty about 
Property Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1288 (2008). 
  95  Smith, supra note 93, at 4, 14–15.  
  96  257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). 
  97  See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and In-
alienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106 & n.34 (1972). 
  98  See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 
106 Y ALE L.J. 2091, 2102 (1997) (“[E]ssentially the appropriate solution is to allow injunctive re-
lief when the relative balance of convenience is anything close to equal, but to deny it (in its en-
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on boundaries but is more complex in that it evaluates uses against a 
backdrop of community norms.99  Whatever the nature of this evalua-
tion is — and it rarely takes the form of explicit cost-benefit analy-
sis — the danger stems from the potential disproportionate hardship of 
an injunction whose costs far outweigh its benefits.  The issues are not 
identical to those in building encroachments because the line between 
the permissible and impermissible is less clear in the first place, mak-
ing bad faith harder, but not always impossible, to pinpoint.100 
III.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODULAR THEORY 
Despite its avowal of nuance, the bundle picture does not stack up 
well against the modular theory when it comes to explanation.  Infor-
mation costs and the need to manage complexity shape property in its 
implementation. 
A.  Explanatory Power 
The modular theory I propose makes a clear contrast with conven-
tional property theories, which are captured in the slogan “bundle of 
rights” or “bundle of sticks.”  Sticks are seen, according to the conven-
tional view, as detachable and customizable, and as serving purposes 
in a freestanding fashion.  When it comes to the relation of these sticks 
to the outside world, however, the bundle picture is assumed to be as 
contextual as possible.  Features of other people, actions, and resources 
are of limitless relevance to each stick, which transparently reflects its 
purposes.  The purposes can include autonomy, privacy, investment, 
planning, and appropriability, and the criteria for evaluating whether 
the goals are being met are drawn from a large set including efficiency, 
fairness, and many forms of morality.  Disagreement centers on what 
the goals are and whether they can be reduced to a single metric.101  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
tirety if necessary) when the balance of convenience runs strongly in favor of the defendant.  The 
usual presumption is that the exploitation risk is greater than the holdout risk.  This presumption 
can be reversed by a showing of the dramatic difference in values . . . .”); Laycock, supra note 92.  
In previous work I have argued that in effect Boomer applies too loose a version of the defense.  
See Smith, supra note 51, at 1037–45.  
  99  See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as 
Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 728–33 (1973); see also Smith, supra note 51. 
  100  See Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1660–63 (2011); Smith, 
supra note 51, at 992–1005.  See generally Gregory C. Keating, Nuisance as a Strict Liability 
Wrong, J. TORT L. (forthcoming) (Univ. of S. Cal. Ctr. in Law, Econ. & Org. Research Paper Ser. 
No. C11-11; Univ. of S. Cal. Legal Studies Research Paper Ser. No. 11-19),  available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1924519. 
  101  See, e.g., HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS (2011); Gregory S. 
Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 
753–73 (2009); Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. 
REV. 1597, 1624–55 (2008).    
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The bottom line is that each stick is seen as a dial or lever for achiev-
ing goals or meeting criteria, and each stick can be trimmed in isola-
tion from the others.  So commentators are led to ask questions such as 
whether exceptions for trespass or the balancing test proposed for nui-
sance are efficient, fair, moral, or conducive to human flourishing.102  
That style of analysis ignores the costs of and even the choice of meth-
ods for achieving these objectives, especially when results emerge from 
the system as a whole rather than its specific parts.  In the service of 
transparent purposes, the bundle picture usually assumes a very un-
constrained use of context.  If trespass and conversion send a simple 
message of “keep off” and “don’t take” (without permission), other as-
pects of property like nuisance (which, not coincidentally, tend to in-
volve neighbors rather than the world at large) involve more infor-
mation about the value of uses, their harm, and the nature of the 
surrounding area.  If delineation cost is left out of the picture, it   
becomes deceptively attractive to move in the direction of more   
governance-style contextualized inquiry into all such matters.  Suggest-
ing the importation of copyright’s notoriously fuzzy and mysterious 
fair use doctrine into the law of trespass in order to capture all and 
sundry societal interests in potential boundary crossings is but an ex-
treme example.103  Promoting the promiscuous employment of contex-
tual information in property is in keeping with ignoring the cost of de-
lineation in the process of serving the purposes of property.   
Legal realists and their successors object to delineation strategies 
that are not fully congruent with these purposes for being too formalis-
tic or conceptualistic.  The implication is that right-thinking people 
would want to serve the purpose in question — say a right of access 
for hikers — and any reluctance to define this stick is mere apology for 
the owner class.  Furthermore, in designing a right to roam, one could 
take all sorts of context into account, like the relative needs of the par-
ties and so on (and on).104  The right to roam, as famously implement-
ed by statute in Scotland, winds up being a complex governance re-
gime requiring interest-balancing that fits uncomfortably in the 
existing “bundle.”105  The postrealist reply is simply that the law has to 
be contextual, and more generally, a realist-style leap of logic has it 
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  102  See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 101, at 747–50, 779–82, 801–10; Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land 
Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 830–32 (2009).  But cf. Eric R. Claeys, Response, Virtue and 
Rights in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 889, 892, 934–35 (2009). 
  103  See Ben Depoorter, Fair Trespass, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1090, 1114 (2011). 
  104  See Jerry L. Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam: Redefining the Landowner’s Bundle of 
Sticks, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 404–09 (2007); John A. Lovett, Progressive Property 
in Action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, 89 NEB. L. REV. 739, 777–90 (2011). 
  105  See Joseph Cooper, The Scottish Right of Access: Symmetry, Reciprocal Causation and 
Compromise in the Context of an Atypical Rule 3 Property Rule 25–26 (May 2011) (unpublished 
student paper, Harvard Law School) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).    
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that because the law sometimes uses context, its use should always be 
feasible.106  The burden is shifted to anyone who wants to deny the 
relevance of context, and when using context can be shown to be con-
gruent with a virtuous purpose, objections are labeled as formalistic or 
worse. 
On the architectural theory, the pattern of standardization is no ac-
cident.  The most basic aspects of property — “don’t trespass,” “don’t 
steal” — are the ones most likely to be parsed by distant and imper-
sonal audiences.  This pattern of standardization is highly consistent 
with the basic architecture of property in terms of exclusion and gov-
ernance.107  An exclusion strategy defines a thing and uses rough prox-
ies to announce generally a rule of “keep off.”  Trespass to land is the 
paradigmatic example.  By contrast, a governance strategy focuses in 
on given uses and prescribes proper behavior with respect to the re-
source.  Governance rules are more tailored and context-specific.  Of-
ten they are directed to a smaller, more defined group of duty holders.  
Thus, in nuisance, a governance regime holds between neighbors.  In 
covenants, the right holder and duty holder are defined by the con-
tract.  (And covenants only run — that is, bind successors in inter-
est — if certain standardizing requirements like “touch and concern” 
are met.)  Zoning too is more fine-grained than a basic exclusion re-
gime.  Thus, those aspects of property that are aimed at the widest and 
most impersonal audience tend to be the most standardized, and we 
allow greater information intensiveness as we move out from this core 
to the refinements that are relevant to more defined subgroups. 
B.  Means and Ends in Property 
Many of the properties of property are emergent.  Just as water 
molecules do not have to be wet for water to be wet, so each stick in 
the bundle and each doctrine of property need not have the desirable 
features we want the system to have.  Wetness is an emergent property 
of water .  So with property law .  Allowing owners to exclude others 
seems nasty and selfish, but whether it is efficient, fair, just, or virtue-
promoting is sometimes only assessable in the context of the system as 
a whole.  For example, the law of trespass in its individual applica-
tions can look very arbitrary, unfair, and even irrational, but it permits 
owners the space (literally, in the case of land) to pursue projects with-
out having to answer to others, thus generally promoting efficiency 
and liberty.  One need not endorse the reasons invoked by the Jacques 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  106  See, e.g., Smith, supra note 57, at 1180–81 (narrating how the logic of realist contract theory 
led to the rejection of the plain meaning rule). 
  107  See Smith, supra note 8, at S467–71.    
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in Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc.108 for excluding Steenberg Homes 
to see the Jacques as deserving robust protection for their refusal.109  
Likewise, where courts hold the line on the numerus clausus principle 
and deem leases “for the duration of the war” or “for life” to be at-will 
tenancies, the result looks weird if it does not contribute to the 
maintenance of a standardized system of property rights that eases in-
formational burdens more generally.110 
Properties like efficiency, fairness, justice, and virtue promotion are 
emergent properties of the property system.  It is certainly relatively 
easy to ask whether isolated individual rules — like the doctrine of ne-
cessity, antidiscrimination law, and the exemption of high-altitude air-
plane overflights from trespass — serve a given purpose.  And some-
times isolating the purposes of individual rules makes some sense, but 
it makes more sense if we realize that our decision in any such situa-
tion is not a freestanding one but one that impacts the rest of the own-
er’s rights and the working of the system.  By making the pieces of the 
bundle fully congruent with their purposes and obscuring the means-
ends relation between property law and the purposes it serves, the 
bundle theory leads to a fallacy of division — like expecting a water 
molecule to be wet.  Requiring that each piece of the system and each 
stick in the bundle transparently reflect or promote our purposes is not 
necessary. 
Nor is it wise.  Again, some features of the system are emergent 
properties.  Take stability.  A realist might want to treat stability as yet 
another detachable feature or lever to be dialed up or down.111  But 
things don’t work that way; stability is a feature that can only be 
evaluated as an aspect of the system.  Nor is stability a factor to be 
balanced whenever we are deciding how to trim and parcel out the 
supposedly separable sticks in the bundle.  To assert that doctrines are 
part of an issue-by-issue balancing of values like community, autono-
my, efficiency, personhood, labor, and distributive justice is to commit 
the fallacy of division.  These are all important values for the system 
to serve, but the bundle picture creates the expectation that the pieces 
of the system will serve these values individually and separably as well 
as collectively.  Little attention is directed toward the possible speciali-
zation of the parts in achieving the goals of the whole.  Thus, trespass 
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  108  563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997). 
  109  See id. at 156–58; see also Merrill & Smith, supra note 52, at 1871–74 (discussing how the 
Jacque decision demonstrates the element of moral decisionmaking inherent in the law of tres-
pass); Smith, supra note 51, at 983–84 (defending Jacque based on information costs). 
  110  Merrill & Smith, supra note 15, at 832–33; see also Merrill & Smith, supra note 23, at 11–12.  
Courts may redefine a term of years to include such leases without entirely giving up on standard-
ization, although it requires additional effort to design and implement such a lease.  Id. at 35. 
  111  See, e.g., DAGAN, supra note 101, at 43 (asserting that contextualized inquiry leads to stabil-
ity of property law).    
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may contribute relatively more to owner security and autonomy, and 
the implied warranty of habitability may specifically promote fairness 
and protection of tenant expectations; but if so, they do so in tandem 
(and with other rules).  There is little reason to expect trespass law it-
self, for example, to be as fair or nuanced as property law as a 
whole.112  Many of the features of property law are emergent, and an 
architectural theory can help explain how they emerge from the work-
ing of the system. 
C.  Implications: Ordinary Property, Custom, and Entity Property 
The implications of the modular theory for property as a law of 
things are many, and I draw out a few here.  It bears repeating that 
some very basic facts about property — its lumpiness and its protec-
tion in the first instance through a very simple regime of trespass — 
receive an explanation.  Likewise, the tendency of nuisance to track 
boundary invasions more than is conventionally expected also receives 
an explanation: the semitransparent modules are important for manag-
ing the complexity of land use interactions.113 
Some striking patterns in the incorporation of custom into law re-
flect the nature of the modular things of property.  I have argued that 
in the course of adapting the mining custom of pedis possessio into the 
law, parcel boundaries have been surprisingly important.114  Under the 
pedis possessio, a miner without a valid claim against the government 
has prelocation rights against other miners to the spot he is working 
on.  Evidently, miners had a common notion of what a “spot” was, but 
when the custom was adopted by courts, the pedis possessio referred to 
the boundaries of the unperfected claim.  Interestingly, in modern 
times, uranium mining companies have been unsuccessful in getting 
the pedis possessio to apply beyond the boundary of a single claim and 
have thus been forced to do a lot of unnecessary make-work.  The 
thing of property, here the parcel boundary, again has a greater gravi-
tational pull than a narrow cost-benefit test keyed to the sticks in the 
bundle would lead one to expect. 
Further suggestive evidence of the role of modular things in prop-
erty law and norms abounds.  Consider how parcel boundaries and the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  112  The alternative is to invoke a plethora of general principles to be balanced as specific situa-
tions present themselves.  For a famous but unusual example of such an approach, see State v. 
Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372–75 (N.J. 1971).  See also Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect 
Relation Between Ends and Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 982–84 
(2009) (discussing Shack).  One can declare by fiat that such a system is not an ad hoc, unstruc-
tured bundle, see DAGAN, supra note 101, at 43, but ad hocery itself is not a feature that can easi-
ly be dialed down!    
  113  See generally Smith, supra note 51. 
  114  See Smith, Community and Custom in Property, supra note 44, at 32–34.    
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exclusion strategy exercise a gravitational pull in unintentional cattle 
trespass: it appears that fencing in, which accords with general posses-
sory norms, is more prevalent than a narrow balancing of the relative 
values of crops and cattle would call for, and the informal norms al-
most always call for fencing in.115  Consider also the law of takings, in 
which an exercise of eminent domain requires just compensation in the 
amount that the parcel is valued according to the fair-market-value 
standard as if the parcel were held in fee simple, and assembly gain 
from unifying lesser interests in a fee simple goes to the condemnees.116  
In a fashion reminiscent of the economic loss rule, a lease whose value 
exceeds the fair market value of the parcel-in-fee goes uncompensated 
under the “unit rule.”117  There are many possible arguments for and 
against each of these results,118 but it is interesting that traditionally 
the rationale was that condemnation was an in rem action (against the 
thing), making internal (and external) considerations irrelevant.119  
Whatever else might be said here, the law of just compensation is 
highly modular. 
One major advantage of the modular theory is that it easily cap-
tures the very types of property that have been thought to present the 
biggest challenge for traditional notions of property and consequently 
are considered to furnish a rationale for moving to the bundle picture.  
Thomas Grey pointed to the rise of abstract rights from increasingly 
sophisticated contracting and financial engineering as incompatible 
with any robust notion of property, or any picture of property other 
than as a label for any collection of features resulting from private and 
public efforts at tailoring entitlements.120  On this view, the bundles 
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  115  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 388–91. 
  116  See generally Victor P. Goldberg, Thomas W. Merrill & Daniel Unumb, Bargaining in the 
Shadow of Eminent Domain: Valuing and Apportioning Condemnation Awards Between Landlord 
and Tenant, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1083 (1987) (discussing how to calculate just compensation in vari-
ous leasehold situations).  External assembly gain from joining parcels goes to the condemnor.  
See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) (“It is the owner’s loss, not the taker’s gain, 
which is the measure of the value of the property taken.”).  This discrepancy is less related to in-
ternal modularity of parcels, and indeed it has come under heavy criticism.  See, e.g., Michael 
Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1468–69 (2008); Amnon 
Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, Eminent Domain, Inc., 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1704, 1706–07 (2007). 
  117  City of Milwaukee Post No. 2874 Veterans of Foreign Wars v. Redev. Auth. of Milwaukee, 
768 N.W.2d 749, 751 (Wis. 2009). 
  118  THOMAS W. MERRILL & DAVID A. DANA, TAKINGS 169–79, 185–90 (2002). 
  119  Crane v. City of Elizabeth, 36 N.J. Eq. 339, 343 (Ct. Err. & App. 1882) (“[Condemnation] 
has thus the distinctive qualities of . . . a taking, not of the rights of designated persons in the 
thing needed, but of the thing itself . . . .”); MERRILL & DANA, supra note 118, at 187 (noting tra-
ditional explanation based on in rem nature of condemnation).  As with a fencing-out regime in 
cattle trespass, which holds one liable for intentionally inducing cattle to graze on the land of an-
other, the unit rule might be expected to apply if the prime motivation of the taker is to wipe out 
the favorable contract of the holder. 
  120  See Grey, supra note 3, at 78.    
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labeled “property” have no independent or essential content.  Interest-
ingly, Grey’s concerns have their antecedents in Adolf Berle’s and 
Gardiner Means’s treatment of the modern corporation.121  Now most 
well-known for their highlighting of the problem of the separation of 
ownership and control in corporations (what we could call the agency 
problem), Berle and Means principally argued that the separation of 
ownership and control in corporations was calling into question the 
notion of private property.122  The title of their work is after all The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property. 
For what Merrill and I have called entity property, regular property 
rights are encapsulated in another layer of modularization.123  Henry 
Hansmann’s and Reinier Kraakman’s theory of asset partitioning 
takes the essential role of organizational law to be the defining of pools 
of assets for availability to some creditors and not others (especially the 
immunity of a firm’s assets from the claims of its owners’ creditors).124  
The creditors of one firm can concentrate on the assets of that firm 
without worrying about the creditors of the owners or unrelated busi-
nesses.  Asset partitioning is a higher-level modularization.  It allows 
for information specialization.  It also permits convenient substitution 
of one creditor for another without the need for coordination — just as 
modular structures do generally. 
More generally, entity property involves modularization, but it is 
modularization of a different sort than in regular property.  The litera-
ture on the modular theory of organizations, which has been growing 
rapidly,125 can be brought together with the modular theory of proper-
ty: entity property is carved up differently and has a hierarchical struc-
ture that makes it special, but it crucially relies on modularity to man-
age complexity. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  121  ADOLF  A.  BERLE, JR. &  GARDINER  C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION  AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
  122  Id. at 333–39. 
  123  I also hypothesize that beneficial interests in trust and other equitable property rights can be 
captured as an iterative use of the recursive process of making a modular thing (reification).  Cf. 
Ben McFarlane & Robert Stevens, The Nature of Equitable Property, 4 J. EQUITY 1 (2010) (at-
tempting to analyze equitable rights as “rights against rights”). 
  124  See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 
YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000). 
  125  See, e.g., BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 32; MANAGING IN THE MODULAR AGE (Raghu 
Garud et al. eds., 2003); Richard N. Langlois, Modularity in Technology and Organization, 49 J. 
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 19 (2002); Ron Sanchez & Joseph T. Mahoney, Modularity, Flexibility, 
and Knowledge Management in Product and Organization Design,  17 S TRATEGIC  MGMT.  J. 
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 63 (1996).    
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IV.  PROPERTY AND PRIVATE LAW 
If property is the law of modular things, this has implications for 
the rest of private law and for its relation to public law.  Let me end 
with some speculative thoughts on the bigger picture, mainly by rais-
ing some open questions. 
Modular property feeds into tort, contract, and restitution in a sim-
ple fashion.  Modular rights are more alienable and are less costly to 
protect (as through the tort of trespass).  They are also easier to identi-
fy and trace as part of restitution, as in mistaken transfers and wrong-
ful takings.126 
The interface between private and public law is more problematic.  
In England, private law operates in a public context, as exemplified by 
ultra vires transactions by local authorities, in much the same fashion 
as between private parties, whereas in the United States, the tendency 
since the realist era has been to define problems at the interface of pri-
vate and public law in public law terms.  Let me highlight one issue. 
The modular theory opens up a range of approaches to the public-
private interface.  One major cluster of issues centers on how the Con-
stitution constrains the application of private law.  Much post–New 
Deal writing downplays or denies the public-private distinction.127  
And yet the courts have been reluctant to efface the distinction alto-
gether.  In the context of applying due process and equal protection to 
the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants, the consensus agrees 
with the Supreme Court’s result in Shelley v. Kraemer,128 but the 
question of when judicial enforcement of private law entitlements is 
state action has involved a difficult exercise in line drawing.129  The 
Court has shied away from holding that judicial enforcement of tres-
pass in a purely private context (for example, exclusion from a dinner 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  126  Cf. Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the Appropriation of Prop-
erty or the Commission of a Wrong, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 504 (1980) (presenting a property-based 
theory of restitution). 
  127  See generally A CKERMAN, supra note 9; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 
COLUM. L. REV. 873, 875–82, 902–04, 917–19 (1987).  Most of these authors assimilate the private 
to the public, but the public has sometimes been analyzed as a scaled-up version of the private.  
See Richard A. Epstein, Playing by Different Rules? Property Rights in Land and Water,  in 
PROPERTY  IN  LAND  AND  OTHER  RESOURCES  317 (Daniel H. Cole & Elinor Ostrom eds., 
2012). 
  128  334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
  129  See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 259–60 (1985); Robert J. 
Glennon, Jr. & John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment “State Ac-
tion” Requirement, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 221, 228–31; Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for 
a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 490–91 (1962); Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination 
and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6–9 (1959); Carol M. 
Rose, Servitudes, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW, supra 
note 23, at 296, 310–11.    
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party) would be state action.130  One might argue that there is no such 
thing as private law, or one might go back to a prerealist idea of the 
inviolability of private law.  The modular theory points in neither di-
rection.  It suggests that it is possible to make such a distinction and 
suggests where the distinction would be drawn if it is to be drawn.  
Trespass is mechanical for the reasons we have discussed, and it dele-
gates control to an owner.  It has involved less evaluation of the rea-
sons for its invocation even than contract enforcement, which is more 
fine-grained and in particular calls for evaluation of agreements for vi-
olations of public policy.  So, state action could be found in the judicial 
enforcement of covenants because the state has long been in the busi-
ness of supervising contracts and covenants for violations of public 
policy, unlike with claims of trespass.  The modular theory does not 
dictate a result, but it makes the trespass-covenant distinction a plau-
sible one. 
Another intersection between public and private has to do with 
changes to the property system itself.  Private parties can contract at 
the interfaces between modular rights, within the constraints of the 
numerus clausus principle.  Delegation to owners, including modifica-
tion of property packages, is sometimes appropriate.  It makes possible 
many of the benefits of private property in terms of individuals’ en-
gaging in decentralized decisionmaking with their own special infor-
mation.131  Likewise, courts can innovate in property law but are not 
supposed to create new property forms.132  The literature on modular 
systems suggests that they are very good at evolving through a range 
of environments, but they can be trapped at a local maximum.133  
Evolutionarily, one may not be able to get to a new optimum by the 
kinds of tinkering that parties and courts can do to the modular struc-
ture.  For major changes remodularization is necessary.  In our legal 
system this type of change is typically channeled to legislatures.134  
When and how legislatures should engage in such remodularizations 
and whether transition relief is appropriate reflect a trade-off between 
the need for stability and precommitment to private parties on the one 
hand and the need for flexibility to remodularize when necessary on 
the other.135  This Article is not the place to develop such a theory, but 
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  130  See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 84, at 465–67. 
  131  See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 524 (1945). 
  132  Merrill & Smith, supra note 23, at 9–10, 23–24. 
  133  See, e.g., Stefano Brusoni et al., The Value and Costs of Modularity: A Problem-Solving Per-
spective, 4 EUR. MGMT. REV. 121, 129–30 (2007). 
  134  Merrill & Smith, supra note 23, at 58–68. 
  135  See, e.g., THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS 
TO U.S. LAW: PROPERTY 223–58 (2010).    
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it is worth noting that the modular theory does bring to bear a set of 
theoretical tools that may prove useful.136 
Finally, the information-cost theory helps hold the New Private 
Law together.  Conventionally it is thought that moral and philosophi-
cally oriented theories of property (and private law) are incompatible 
with law and economics and other related functional or consequential-
ist approaches.  But if information costs and the need to manage com-
plexity through modularity in particular are brought into the picture, 
the lumpiness of property, the bilateral structure of private law, and 
the heavy reliance on everyday morality — features thought to be the 
unique province of corrective justice and its relatives — receive a 
high-level utilitarian explanation.137  I am not arguing for utilitarian 
foundations in a philosophical sense.  If explanations based on infor-
mation costs, complexity, and the nearly decomposable system of social 
interactions dovetail with moral theories, it is quite likely not an acci-
dent.  This convergence is a consequence of complexity.  As Herbert 
Simon pointed out, complexity can lead us to be “in-principle” reduc-
tionists and “practical” holists.138  When we approach information 
costs in a reductionist fashion, property is naturally and for practical 
purposes seen as a holistic law of things. 
CONCLUSION 
Property law is a modular system.  It helps define what a thing is 
in the first place and why we should care.  It gives content to the no-
tion of a “law of things.”  Content is what is lacking in the bundle pic-
ture — so lacking that the bundle fails to be a theory of property at all.  
Instead of positing detachable sticks that directly serve goals like au-
tonomy, privacy, investment, planning, and appropriability according 
to criteria of efficiency, fairness, and morality, the modular theory of 
property explains how property law furnishes some basic building 
blocks of private law.  Modular property manages the complexity of 
human interactions by using exclusionary strategies to treat these in-
teractions as nearly decomposable and by delineating semitransparent 
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  136  See, e.g., Oliver Baumann & Nicolaj Siggelkow, Dealing with Complexity: Integrated   
vs. Chunky Search Processes (Sept. 29,  2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1104617 (modeling modular or “chunky” versus integrated search). 
  137  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 52, at 1850–52 (arguing that, because property rights are in 
rem, they present an information problem that calls for heavy reliance on everyday morality); see 
also Smith, supra note 60, at 30–31 (“If we add a concern with information costs to the law and 
economics of torts, then the economic explanations and justifications of tort law look less different 
from those based on corrective justice and civil recourse.  Law and economics can give an account 
of the bilateral structure of tort law and gives information cost reasons for moral rights and duties 
to be woven into tort law.” (footnote omitted)).  
  138  SIMON, supra note 33, at 195 (“In the face of complexity an in-principle reductionist may be 
at the same time a pragmatic holist.”).    
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boundaries around complementary clusters of attributes.  It then speci-
fies the interface between the modular components of property 
through governance strategies that make more direct reference to uses 
and purposes, as in the law of nuisance, covenants, and zoning.  This 
interface also contains the very important equitable safety valves that 
allow the baselines of property to be simple without being vulnerable 
to opportunists.  In contrast to the bundle-of-rights picture, the modu-
lar theory captures how a great number of features of property — 
ranging from its in rem aspect, the right to exclude, and the residual 
claim, through alienability, persistence, and compatibility, and beyond, 
to deep aspects like recursion, scalability, and resilience — follow from 
the modular architecture.  The modular platform allows communica-
tion with actors near and far in a parsimonious manner.  Modular 
property is neither absolute nor formal across the board, but it helps 
explain how and when we incur the cost of delineating property rights 
in a complex world.  It furnishes the things that property as a law of 
things contributes to private law. 